Fannie Mae Creates Blacklist of Appraisers…

Fannie Mae Creates Appaiser Blacklist; Do AMCs Make Sense? Bank M&A Rolls On – Are Mortgage Banks Doing the Same?

If you don't think the nation is changing, think again.California's Latino population is going to overtake the white population in only two months, according to this year's state budget report. And the Golden State is also getting older, with the population of over 65s predicted to hit a boom over the coming months (1,000 people out there turn 65 every day). The state has been getting more diverse for a while, but now the Latino population will be 'the single largest race or ethnic group', and it's thought to be because most Latino groups are in their prime childbearing years. According to the 2013-2014 report, by March Latinos will make up 39 per cent of California's population of 38.2 million and outstrip the white population by 76,000; non-Hispanic whites will make up 38.8 per cent.

Speaking of California, San Francisco's Parkside Lending continues its growth. Parkside's recently broke news about the formation of its REIT, release of its new non-QM product and expansion into new states. One can add to the list new growth and job openings on its San Francisco operations team for a QC Manager, In-house Council, as well as a Closing Manager. Confidential inquiries can be submitted to Rick Nelson at Rick@parksidelending .com or visit "careers".

And First National Bank is expanding its operations in Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore and is searching for experienced Mortgage Loan Originators. First National Bank is an affiliate of F.N.B. Corporation, a diversified financial services company with over $12 billion in assets and services including banking, trust, consumer finance, and insurance. "F.N.B. Corporation (http://www.fnbcorporation.com/) has community banking offices are located in several states including Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, and West Virginia. The Mortgage Originator is responsible for the generating residential mortgages, which includes working with existing customers with residential mortgage needs and developing new business from external sources. This position will also need to provide the highest quality of customer service to both internal and external customers. "We offer a competitive commission structure, 401K, medical, dental, vision, stock purchase program, and much more!"  Please visit FNB's careers website to complete an online application.

Just when we think everything is quiet on the appraisal front, Kate Berry with American Banker writes thatFannie Mae has created a blacklist for appraisers. "In its ongoing effort to flag defective loans long before they default, Fannie Mae is taking aim at the home appraisal industry. The government-sponsored enterprise is keeping a virtual blacklist of appraisers that it views as shady and is warning banks and mortgage lenders to be careful about doing business with them. All loans with work done by appraisers on the list will be subject to extra scrutiny before Fannie buys them from lenders and could be rejected outright, Fannie says. The list is a small one, with just four names on it for now, but it is likely to grow as Fannie scours its appraisal database to identify appraisers who repeatedly submit shoddy work. Unacceptable appraisal practices include inflating the appraised value of a home, misstating the characteristics of a house, and failing to use the best comparable sales of physically similar properties…Fannie has moved toward a model in which appraisals are scrutinized early in the mortgage process before it even buys a loan from a lender. Instead of forcing costly buy backs for defective loans years after the fact, Fannie now will reject loans for egregious inconsistences made by appraisers."

Ms. Berry's well-written article continued: "Fannie's aim is to not just make sure that the loans it buys and bundles into mortgage-backed securities meet its standards, but also to collect consistent data on appraisals to ensure that property values are accurate and that borrowers have the ability to repay their loans over the long haul without defaulting. Fannie has not made its blacklist public. The list, to be published monthly, is accessible only by lenders and will not be broadly distributed. Observers say that the mere existence of a blacklist will likely deter banks and mortgage lenders from doing business with appraisers whose names appear on the list."

Certainly appraisals are coming under increased scrutiny. For example, here's a recent article stating that there are more appraisal flaws since the "invention" of the appraisal management company.

Mike Ousley, President of Direct Valuation Solutions (DVS), a compliant and automated direct to appraiser SaaS platform for lenders wrote, "Rob, most folks know that HVCC sunset and Appraiser Independence was reinforced when the Dodd-Frank Act went into effect. It is still, however, amazing to me how many lenders have interpreted both HVCC and Appraisal Independence rules in Dodd-Frank to mean that they MUST use an AMC.  The article in Newsday [noted above] points out this myth, as well as some other unintended consequences of the Appraisal Management Company model. 'The upshot is that appraisers who have never stepped foot in a neighborhood and who have no historic knowledge are now paid less to do an appraisal, and the results have been, in the words of one appraiser, disastrous.' Far too many AMCs pay only a fraction (often 50% or less) of the consumer paid appraisal fee to the appraiser, assuring less experienced and less neighborhood knowledgeable appraisers doing the valuation and collateral due diligence, thus jeopardizing the transaction as well as putting the lender at buyback risk. In this technologically advanced day and age – what with the Uniform Appraisal Dataset (UAD) and automated assignment logic and quality control – aren't lenders putting their very business futures and reputation at risk by utilizing one of the literally hundreds of third party AMCs (many only thinly managed or capitalized) rather than consider taking control of the valuation process and directly hiring knowledgeable and local appraisers through compliant SaaS software systems?"

And Brian Coester with Coester VMS (http://www.coestervms.com/) writes, "I completely disagree with the article not just based on owning an AMC but on the basis of being an appraiser and being on both sides of the table. The reality is the appraisals are more accurate than they've ever been. The issue of geographic competency and fees and pressure to hit the value has been a topic for years, and appraisers have been complaining about the same things for years. Yes, fees haven't gone up in some time but that will change in time as well as AMCs will get their business processes in place to be able to make less and automate most functions. The appraisal industry has been turned upside down, but for the long term betterment of the industry. In the short term there will be issues to work out; however appraisals are better than they've ever been. The reason for the appearance of lack of quality is now we just know have the ability to check against relevant data like an AVM, Automated scoring, UCDP and variety of other tools that weren't available before. The reality is appraisals are generally right, and most do a great job, the generalization that 'AMCs are killing the industry' is a huge overstatement and inaccurate. The thing 'killing the industry' is the fact the appraisal fee is a competitive price point for lenders and that the GSEs, as well as HUD, don't allow trainee appraisers to inspect the property which limits new trainees in a big way."

Hey, one training note! Yesterday I mentioned several Plaza Home Mortgage training events in Florida, and missed one in Illinois: "Successful Selling to the Realtor Market". It is slated for tomorrow the 29th, from 8:30 to 11:30AM, at the Doubletree by Hilton Chicago Oak Brook. Link

Moving over to life with depository banks, John C. writes, "Here's a map showing a time-lapse map of bank closures. You can re-size the circles in the graph to reflect bank size, loss to the FDIC, etc.:http://graphicsweb.wsj.com/documents/Failed-US-Banks.html. Yes, we've had a couple recent closures. Regulators closed The Bank of Union ($331mm, OK) and sold it to BancFirst ($5.9B, OK) under a purchase & assumption agreement. BancFirst gets 2 branches, all deposits (excluding brokered) and about 68% of the assets. And DuPage National Bank, West Chicago, Illinois, was closed, and Republic Bank of Chicago, Oak Brook, Illinois stepped in.

But there is plenty of bank M&A as banks see geographic and cost-saving benefits from joining forces. SNL Financial reports there were 242 whole bank acquisitions in 2013 vs. 244 in 2012 and an average price to tangible book of 1.24x. Bay Commercial Bank ($327mm, CA) will acquire Community Bank of San Joaquin ($119mm, CA) for about $4.8mm. Peoples Bank ($1.9B, OH) will acquire The First National Bank of Wellston ($92mm, OH) for $12.6mm in cash and stock. Evans Bank ($818mm, NY) said it has partnered with Welch ATM to provide machines in Rite Aid stores across New York State. Industry Bancshares ($2.4B, TX), the holding company of five TX banks, will acquire Bank of Brenham ($100mm, TX) for an undisclosed sum. The parent company of Stillwater National Bank and Trust Co. ($1.7B, OK) and Bank of Kansas ($294mm, KS) will sell 3 branches in KS with $135mm in deposits to BancCentral ($318mm, OK) and Fidelity Bank ($1.5B, KS). BancorpSouth Bank ($13B, MS) will acquire Central Community Corp ($1.3B, TX) for $210.8mm in cash (14%) and stock (86%). And First Federal of Northern Michigan ($214mm, MI) will acquire Bank of Alpena ($74mm, MI) for $4.3mm in stock.

Investment banker Keefe, Bruyette & Woods has been busy, doing 5 bank transactions already in January. It acted as financial advisor to Jefferson Bancshares, Inc. in a transaction where HomeTrust Bancshares and Jefferson Bancshares signed a definitive agreement under which HomeTrust will acquire Jefferson. Upon the completion of the transaction, the combined company is expected to have approximately $2.1 billion in assets. And TriCo Bancshares and North Valley Bancorp jointly announced that the companies have agreed to combine their two leading northern California bank franchises in a transaction valued at approximately $178.4 million. (The combined company will have approximately $3.5 billion in assets, $3.1 billion in deposits, $2.2 billion in gross loans and approximately 80 branches throughout California – stretching from Bakersfield in the south to Crescent City in the north.) Center Bancorp, Inc. and ConnectOne Bancorp, Inc. jointly announced that they have entered into a definitive agreement to merge, in a transaction valued at $243 million. And VantageSouth Bancshares, Inc. and Yadkin Financial Corporation jointly announced that they have entered into a definitive merger agreement.  The combination will create the largest community bank headquartered in North Carolina with approximately $4.0 billion in assets and significant distribution and scale across the state.

Turning to the agency MBS world, the flows were light on Monday. A trader summed things up by reminding us, "Mortgages continue to trade at uber-tight levels caused by a Fed that buys double the net production being created by originators. Even at the pace our economic team sees QE slowing down ($10 billion every session), we still see the Fed buying more than net production all the way to July/August."

For news, the one yesterday showed that purchases of new homes in the U.S. fell more than forecast in December, ending the industry's best year since 2008. (Sales decreased 7 percent to a 414,000 annualized pace, but for all of 2013, demand jumped 16.4 percent to 428,000, the most in five years.) But in spite of the continued Fed purchase volume, and the slowing housing news, agency MBS prices worsened about .250 and the 10-yr closed at 2.77%.

This morning we've had the always volatile Durable Goods number (December was expected lower on headline and core readings, and it came out at -4.3%, core -1.6%). We'll also have the S&P Case Shiller home price index for November, the release of January's Consumer Confidence, and the 1PM EST $32 billion 2-yr note auction. In the early going rates are a shade better: the 10-yr is at 2.75% and MBS prices are higher by .125.

 

Language discrepancies naturally arise in different geographic regions, like the raging "pop" vs. "soda" debate. But the South undoubtedly takes the cake. Conversations south of the Mason-Dixon Line will befuddle anyone not born there, and here is part 1 of 4 (or 5) of some of the more "interesting" Southern sayings with explanations.

1. "We're living in high cotton."

Cotton has long been a key crop to the South's economy, so every harvest farmers pray for tall bushes loaded with white fluffy balls in their fields. Tall cotton bushes are easier to pick and yield higher returns. If you're living "in high cotton," it means you're feeling particularly successful or wealthy.

2. "She was madder than a wet hen."

Hens sometimes enter a phase of "broodiness" – they'll stop at nothing to incubate their eggs and get agitated when farmers try to collect them. Farmers used to dunk hens in cold water to "break" their broodiness. You don't want to be around a hormonal hen after she's had an ice bath.

3. "He could eat corn through a picket fence."

This describes someone with an unfortunate set of buck teeth. They tend to stick up and outward, like a horse's teeth. Imagine a horse eating a carrot, and you'll get the picture.

Best Regards, Chris Mesunas.

 

Mortgage Rates Pushing Well into 2014…

Mortgage Rates Push Well Into New 2014 Lows

Mortgage rates continued a strong move lower today, benefiting from a global sell-off in risk-related assets.  What's a risk-related asset?  In this case, it's a catch-all term for investments that carry greater risk and greater reward, such as stocks and emerging market currencies.  When risk-assets get trounced, bond markets are often one of the safe-haven beneficiaries, and stronger bond markets mean lower mortgage rates.

In the current case, and indeed in most cases where there is a large tidal exchange across the risk spectrum, mortgage rates aren't able to fall as quickly as more direct beneficiaries like Treasuries.  Still, they're falling.  Most of the improvement has been in the form of lower closing costs for the same interest rates quoted yesterday, but some borrowers may be an eighth of a point lower today.  4.5% remains the most prevalently quoted conforming 30yr fixed rate for ideal scenarios (best-execution), but 4.375% is VERY close at several lenders.  When adjusted for day to day changes in closing costs, rates fell an equivalent of 0.03-0.04% today.

While unexpected, the improvement in rates is certainly welcome.  The question is whether or not it will carry over into next week.  The other question is how much markets will even be concerned with what had been shaping up to be a big FOMC Announcement on Wednesday.  If global markets continue in this same vein next week, the momentum could easily overshadow the Fed.  The counterpoint and the risk is that such episodes of global risk-aversion and emerging market panic are not uncommon.  They happen a few times a year.  Sometimes the Eurozone crisis happens and sometimes things blow over.  On the occasions where things blow over, rates tend to snap back higher fairly quickly.

 

Loan Originator Perspectives

 

 

"Another nice day for consumers floating their rates. I find it hard to recommend not locking today, especially if you are closing within a couple weeks. The rally could continue next week, but it seems like today is a great day to lock in and secure the recent gains. " –Victor Burek, Open Mortgage

"Good to see rates rally again today. Too early to say if this is the start of a larger move, or a momentary pause in the long term trend towards higher rates, next week will tell the tale. Not adverse to floating here, with a quick finger on the lock button, as long as you're aware that quick gains can evaporate equally quickly." –Ted Rood, Senior Mortgage Planner, Wintrust Mortgage

"Yea for stocks tanking worldwide. Bad for our 401Ks and good for bonds and rates. I'll take the lower rates all day long. Since there is only the stock lever helping us, that could easily reverse course. If it does any gains will disappear. Locking even on a Friday makes sense to me as this is the best we've been in awhile. If rates continue a decline, then float downs and renegotiations will be available." –Michael Owens, VP of Mortgage Lending at Guaranteed Rate, Inc. NMLS # 107434

 


Today's Best-Execution Rates

  • 30YR FIXED – 4.5%
  • FHA/VA – 4.25%
  • 15 YEAR FIXED –  3.5%
  • 5 YEAR ARMS –  3.0-3.50% depending on the lender


Ongoing Lock/Float Considerations

  • The prospect of the Fed reducing its asset purchases weighed heavy on interest rates for the 2nd half of 2013, causing volatility and generally pervasive upward movement.
  • Tapering ultimately happened on December 18th, 2013.  Markets had done so much to come to terms with it ahead of time that it essentially just confirmed the the 6 month move higher in rates, but didn't make for another immediate spike higher.
  • That said, we should assume that we're still in a rising rate environment on average with scattered pockets of recovery providing clear opportunities to lock.  
  • The exceptionally weak employment data on January 10th provided on of these "pockets of recovery."  There are two ways to approach these.  More risk tolerant: set a line in the sand just slightly higher in cost than your current quote.  In other words, this could be either the next .125% higher in rate or simply a few hundred dollars more in closing costs.  Then commit to lock when your quote crosses above that line in the sand.  Less risk tolerant: lock on the day of or day after any significant move lower in rates.
  • (As always, please keep in mind that our Best-Execution rate always pertains to a completely ideal scenario.  There are many reasons a quoted rate may differ from our average rates, and in those cases, assuming you're following along on a day to day basis, simply use the Best-Ex levels we quote as a baseline to track potential movement in your quoted rate).
Best Regards, Chris Mesunas.

 

Sacramento County Home Prices Remain Steady…

Sacramento County's median home price remains steady

 

 

New Risk to Housing Market…

Refighting the ‘mortgage wars’ could bring new risks to the housing market

By Published: January 17

 

In the five years since the 2008 financial crisis, there have been various attempts to make sense of what happened and why.

The latest — and, to my mind, one of the more convincing — comes in a new book, “Mortgage Wars,” by Timothy Howard, the former chief financial officer of housing finance giant Fannie Mae. Howard’s thesis is that the crisis was the result of a bitter and protracted political war that pit Fannie and its corporate cousin Freddie Mac against a group of giant banks and ideological foes determined to break their lucrative hold over the $11 trillion American home-mortgage market. In the end, Howard argues, the banks prevailed long enough to lead themselves and the rest of us over the cliff.

As Congress figures out what to do with Fannie and Freddie, which are now in government conservatorship, the worst mistake would be to get sucked back into refighting the old battles. Yet that is precisely how the debate is shaping up, with conservative ideologues once again railing against government interference in the free market, the mortgage-industrial complex waving the bloody shirt of “housing affordability,” and even the White House warning against a return to a “flawed business model” that, in truth, did precisely what it was intended to do.

Let’s be clear: Fannie and Freddie did not cause the financial crisis or the mortgage crisis that triggered it, at least not in the way their critics allege.

As Howard and others have pointed out, Fan and Fred’s giant portfolios of mortgage-backed securities — the portfolios bought with money borrowed at advantageous government rates that former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan warned would one day lead to financial Armageddon — were not, in fact, the source of significant financial loss. They may have stopped throwing off profits during the crisis, but taken as a whole they didn’t lose much.

Nor did Fan and Fred get into trouble because of mandates from Democrats in Congress and from the Bush administration to provide more financing to low-income households. In fact, the bulk of the nontraditional loans that they bought at the height of the mortgage bubble brought them further from meeting their affordable housing goals, not closer.

As Howard tells it, the real story begins two decades ago, when big banks and other mortgage lenders sought a bigger share of a mortgage finance business that was generating year after year of double-digit earnings growth for Fan and Fred.

As government-sponsored enterprises, Fan and Fred had the advantage not only of access to cheaper funding, but also lower capital requirements than banks, effectively giving them the power to set the price of housing finance and underbid any competitor. And in their other role, as the dominant insurer of mortgage-backed securities, Fran and Fred could dictate the terms, structure and eligibility requirements of any mortgages that banks and other lenders might want to sell into the secondary market. They weren’t shy about using their market power to capture whatever surplus the industry had to offer while building formidable political machines to protect their lucrative duopoly from competition, criticism and regulatory encroachments.

By the mid-’90s, the campaign against Fan and Fred was in full swing. Academic papers and studies showed that most of the benefits of Fan and Fred’s government backing were going to shareholders and richly compensated executives, not homeowners. Ideological conservatives such as Greenspan were enlisted to warn of the dire risks to the financial system and the prospect of a massive government bailout. Newly resurgent Republicans in Congress, many supported by generous political contributions from the banks, called for legislation to cut Fan and Fred down to size. Even top officials of the Clinton administration’s Treasury Department, angered by Fan and Fred’s political bullying and frustrated by their unwillingness to accept any meaningful reforms, turned against them.

The beginning of the end came in 2004, when Fred and then Fan got tied up in accounting scandals that few people understood and, as subsequent litigation revealed, turned out to be less scandalous than first portrayed. But in the overheated political environment that the banks had created, the restatements were enough to force the resignation of top executives at both firms, including Howard, and send the firms into a full-blown political and regulatory retreat from which they never recovered.

In the meantime, thanks to low interest rates, a booming housing market and lax federal regulation, the banks and their financial allies had set up an alternative system for financing home purchases using types of mortgages Fan and Fred normally ignored: “Subprime” mortgages to people with blemished credit records. “Alt-A” mortgages that didn’t require documentation of income. “Interest-only” mortgages that required no repayment of principal. “Option ARM” mortgages that allowed borrowers to make whatever monthly payments they chose.

The aggressive marketing of these mortgage products by the banks and their Wall Street allies had two notable effects. First, it turned a booming housing market into a speculative bubble, particularly in California, Arizona and Nevada. Second, it reduced Fan and Fred’s share of newly issued mortgages from 70 percent of the market in 2003 to 40 percent by 2006. Fan and Fred were no longer setting prices or lending standards — the banks and Wall Street were.

It was only then that Fan and Fred, desperate to recover market share and double-digit earnings growth, relaxed the standards for the mortgages they would buy and guarantee. In the end, Howard estimates from public filings, losses from those nontraditional mortgages bought in the three years before the crash accounted for at least half of the $120 billion in credit losses ultimately suffered by Fan and Fred. The rest were the result you would have expected for the country’s largest mortgage insurers after a giant bubble burst.

In other words, if anyone can be said to have caused the housing crisis, it was the banks and their Wall Street allies, abetted by regulators who were either clueless or blinded by their free-market ideology. Not that Fan and Fred were blameless. Although Howard glosses over this point, their arrogance and political intransigence set the stage for the mortgage wars. And their desperate attempts to regain market share further inflated the speculative bubble that the banks created.

But here’s the thing: While Fan and Fred wound up with credit losses that were roughly double the capital they were holding, their ensuing government rescue didn’t cost the taxpayers a dime. The reason is quite simple. In the years since the crisis, Fan and Fred stepped in and did what they were created to do — provide mortgage financing and guarantees when private lenders and insurers would not. Not only have they kept the housing market afloat, but all that new business has also proven so profitable that the Treasury has been repaid the $186 billion it provided during the crisis, and is even expected to earn a profit of at least $50 billion.

What the government did for Fannie and Freddie, in effect, was no different than what it did for the banks. Yet while the banks have re-emerged as profitable, well-capitalized private companies whose shareholders have done well in the past few years, Fan and Fred remain captives of the government, their assets and profits confiscated and their shareholders effectively wiped out. The government’s use of Fed and Fan as a piggy bank has become so egregious that the bottom-fishing hedge funds that now hold most of their shares have a good chance of prevailing in lawsuits against the government alleging illegal and unconstitutional seizure, an outcome that could cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars in damages.

This clearer understanding of what happened makes it easier to understand what needs to be done.

For starters, the Fan and Fred duopoly has to end. They must be stripped of their special powers to borrow money at government rates, and they must be required to license their valuable software and databases to other private firms so these firms can enter the market on equal terms. The government would need to tightly regulate all such mortgage packagers and guarantors, and require them to raise enough capital to survive a crisis as big as the last one and pay the government an annual premium to insure them against losses in excess of their capital. That regulatory structure should sound familiar, since it is exactly what the government does with banks.

There is still an open question as to how much capital should be required. The leading proposal by Sens. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Mark R. Warner (D-Va.) sets it at 10 percent, a ridiculously high number that Corker apparently picked out of the air to placate Fan and Fred’s longtime opponents. Five percent would have more than covered the losses from the last crisis while pushing up mortgage rates by a more tolerable half a percentage point.

The Corker-Warner proposal has two other glaring flaws. One is that it provides no mechanism for the government to step in as a lender of last resort when private banks and investors decide to flee the mortgage market, as history shows they regularly do. For conservatives to claim, as they do, that this is not a proper role for government is hard to square with the fact that it is precisely what they have demanded that Fan and Fred do since 2008. We know now that a lender of last resort can prevent a sometimes-irrational market from failing and stabilize the economy at little or no long-term cost to taxpayers.

The proposal’s other flaw is its stake-through-the-heart treatment of Fan and Fred. The bill demands that all employees be fired, everything of value be sold off for the benefit of the government and the companies close their doors. Not only would that destabilize the recovering housing market, but it also all but guarantees that the banks and Wall Street will realize their long-standing goal of stealing away one of the Washington region’s most important industries.

It is hard to understand why Warner, the senior senator from Virginia, would demand the liquidation of Freddie Mac, one of the largest employers in his state. Instead, he ought to be joining with the rest of the region’s politicians in demanding that Fan and Fred be reformed, recapitalized and preserved as part of a new and more competitive housing finance infrastructure anchored in Washington, not Wall Street.

Best Regards, Chris Mesunas

 

New QM Harms Homeowners…

How QM Harms Homeowners -House Committee Hearing
Jan 14 2014

The House Financial Services Committee heard testimony from five persons, almost all representing mortgage lenders, at a hearing today entitled How Prospective and Current Homeowners Will Be Harmed by the CFPB's Qualified Mortgage Rule.  Given the title of the hearing it is not surprising that four of the five spoke out against the regulations.

Jack Hartings, President and CEO of The Peoples Bank Company and Vice Chairman of the Independent Community Bankers of America told the committee that reform of QM is a key plank of ICBA's Regulatory Relief Agenda. 

Mortgage lending by community banks represents approximately 20 percent of the national mortgage market and is often the only source of mortgage lending in the small communities they serve, he said.  The 20 percent actually understates the significance of their mortgage lending as they make a larger share of their home purchase loans to low-or moderate-income borrowers or borrowers in low- or moderate-income neighborhoods and make a larger share of home purchase loans than loans for other purposes such as refinancing or home improvement.

Hartings said there is question that the QM rule will adversely affect his own bank's mortgage lending even though it qualifies as a small creditor making fewer than 500 mortgage loans annually and having less than $2 billion in assets.  "Even though my asset size is well below the $2 billion, in 2012 I made 493 mortgage loans.  We believe this threshold is far too low and is not consistent with the asset threshold."   He later pointed out that such low thresholds could prevent his bank from expanding its lending as the economy recovers.

Non-QM loans will be subject to significant legal risk under the Ability to Repay (ATR) rule and the liability for violations is draconian, he said.   Non-compliance with ATR could also serve as a defense to foreclosure if the loan is deemed not to be a QM loan and small community banks do not have the legal resources to manage this degree of risk. Thus these banks, he said, will not continue to make some of the loans they have made in the past such as low dollar amount loans, balloon payment mortgages, and higher priced mortgage loans.

The full impact of ATR goes beyond QM compliance as banks must still analyze each loan for ATR compliance, a costly and time consumer procedure.  It is necessary to expect that regulators will want to see documentation of the eight ATR underwriting factors and if they are not sufficient the asset could be downgraded and subject to high capital requirements. 

Without "small creditor" status, he said, his loans will be subject to a 43 percent debt-to-income limitation, a lower price trigger for "high cost" QM status which carries higher liability risk, and restrictions on balloon loans.  ICBA is urging Congress to raise the loan volume threshold. The problem could be easily addressed by disregarding loans sold into the secondary market in applying the threshold," Hartings said.

Daniel Weickenand CEO, Orion Federal Credit Union testifying on behalf of The National Association of Federal Credit Unions said that credit unions have always been some of the most highly regulated of all financial institutions, facing restrictions on who they can serve and their ability to raise capital and the Federal Credit Union Act has strict consumer protection rules.  Despite the fact that they were not the cause of the financial crisis, they are still firmly within the regulatory reach of rules promulgated by CFPB.

The impact of this growing compliance burden is evident as the number of credit unions continues to decline, he said, dropping by more than 900 institutions since 2009.  One cause of this decline is the increasing cost and complexity of complying with the ever-increasing onslaught of regulations.  "We remain concerned about the QM standard and that this rule will potentially reduce access to credit and hamper the ability of credit unions to continue to meet their member's needs," he said.

A number of mortgage products sought by credit union members and offered by credit unions are non-QM loans and may disappear from the market.  He said a forty-year mortgage loan, a product sought by credit union members in high costs areas, exceeds the maximum loan term for QMs, and because of a problematic definition, a number of credit unions make mortgage loans with points and fees greater than 3% because they can leverage relationships with affiliates to get the best deal for their members.

Because a credit union will not receive any presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay requirements for a non-QM loan, the least risk to credit unions would be to originate only QM loans.  His own credit union, Weickenand said, has decided to go that route and a recent NAFCU survey revealed that a majority of credit unions will cease or greatly reduce their offerings of non-QMs.

Weickenand said that NAFCU strongly supports bipartisan pieces of legislation in the House (H.R. 1077/ H.R. 3211) to alter the definition of "points and fees" prescribed by the QM standard and an exemption from the QM cap on points and fees: (1) affiliated title charges, (2) double counting of loan officer compensation, (3) escrow charges for taxes and insurance, (4) lender-paid compensation to a correspondent bank, credit union or mortgage brokerage firm, and (5) loan level price adjustments which is an upfront fee that the Enterprises charge to offset loan-specific risk factors such as a borrower's credit score and the loan-to-value ratio.

Like Hartings, he supports an increase in the exemption's asset size and 500 mortgage thresholds.  He said many credit unions are approaching one or both thresholds which will render the small lender exemption moot for them. 

The Association also believes that all mortgages held in portfolio should be exempt from the QM rule not just small credit unions and would like to be able to continue to offer mortgages of 40 years or less duration as QMs.  NAFCU also supports Congress directing the CFPB to revise aspects of the 'ability-to-repay' rule that dictates a consumer have a total debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 43 percent or less which will prevent otherwise healthy borrowers from obtaining mortgage loans and will have a particularly serious  impact in rural and underserved  areas where consumers  have  a limited number of options.

Bill Emerson, CEO of Quicken Loans and Vice Chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association spoke on behalf of the trade group, starting his testimony by saying, "I can tell you categorically that Quicken Loans, like theoverwhelming majority of lenders, will not lend outside the boundaries of QM. In fact, even if we wanted to, we wouldn't be able to make non-QM loans because there is no discernable secondary market for them. The only place these loans can be kept is on a bank's balance sheet."

"Beyond that, the liability for originating non-QM is simply too great. Claimants can sue for actual and statutory damages, as well as a refund of their finance charges and attorney's fees, and there is no statute of limitations in foreclosure claims. By MBA's calculations, protracted litigation for an average loan can exceed the cost of the loan itself.

Given this uncertainty, at least for the foreseeable future he said non-QM lending is likely to be limited to three categories; loans where there are unintended mistakes, higher balance and non-traditional loans to wealthier borrowers, and loans made by a few lenders to riskier borrowers, but at significantly higher rates. He said the rate sheets he had seen suggest borrowers could pay an interest rate of 9-10 percent for non-QM loans.

Emerson said it remains very important to make adjustments to the QM rule. "The CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) deserves enormous credit for working with all stakeholders, lenders and consumer groups alike, and fashioning a rule we think is a substantial improvement over Dodd-Frank. We are also grateful the Bureau is open to making additional revisions in the near future."

There is a major problem with the 3 percent cap on points and fees for QM eligibility.  Because so many origination costs are fixed, a lot of smaller loans, particularly in the $100,000 to $150,000 range, will trip the 3 percent cap and fall outside the QM definition, pricing consumers, especially first-time homebuyers and families living in rural and underserved areas, out of the market.

"Additionally, the final rule picks winners and losers between affiliated and unaffiliated settlement service providers, even though their fees are subject to identical regulation. At Quicken Loans, we have chosen to affiliate with title and other service providers to ensure our customers have the best loan experience and that there are no surprises at the closing table."  His company, he said, has won awards because its affiliated arrangements have led to a smooth closing process.

Emerson said the MBA urges the House to promptly pass H.R. 3211, the Mortgage Choice Act.

Michael D. Calhoun, President of the Center for Responsible Lending was the only one of the five presenting testimony in favor of the CFPB's rules.  Calhoun said those rules strike the right balance of providing borrower protections while also ensuring access to credit. 

The QM rule covers 95 percent of current originations according to Moody Analytics he said that this broad coverage is because CFPB established four different pathways for a mortgage to gain QM status. The first uses a 43 percent back-end debt-to-income ratio. A second is based on eligibility for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and a third is specifically crafted for small creditors holding loans in portfolio. Lastly, there is a pathway for balloon loans as well. This multi-faceted approach will maintain access to affordable credit for borrowers.

"This broad definition is key for borrowers, including borrowers of color who represent 70% of the net household growth through 2023.  The broad definition means that borrowers will not be boxed out of getting a home loan and will also benefit from the protections that come with a Qualified Mortgage.  In addition, several lenders have said they will originate mortgages that do not meet QM requirements, holding them in their own portfolios.  Calhoun said he expects this will only grow over time. 

As a whole, these rules continue the CFPB's approach of expanding access to credit while ensuring that loans are sustainable for the borrower, the lender and the overall economy, Calhoun said.

Also testifying was Frank Spencer, President and CEP of Habitat for Humanity's Charlotte, North Carolina Chapter.  Spencer was primarily asking for relief from QM and ATR requirements for his organization which currently services approximately 780 mortgages.  Spencer said that despite the fact that the mortgages are non-interest bearing and that most of the chapters that originate them fall far below the thresholds of QM, some of the charity's operations trigger the requirements and present significant liability for its officers and community partners. 

Best Regards, Chris Mesunas

 

Mortgage Fraud Committed by Ex-Loan Officer…

Ex-loan officer pleads guilty in mortgage fraud scheme involving Roseville, Rocklin properties

 

Published: Thursday, Jan. 9, 2014 – 4:33 pm

A former Sacramento-area loan officer has pleaded guilty to his role in a mortgage fraud scheme that included properties in Placer County.

Alexander A. Romaniolis, 48, of Irvine, entered the plea today in federal court in Sacramento, according to a Department of Justice news release. A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment in March 2013, charging him with mail fraud.

According to court documents, Romaniolis recruited five straw buyers to purchase eight California residential properties in Rocklin, Roseville and San Clemente. He assisted the straw buyers in providing false information to lenders about their employment, income, assets and their intent to occupy properties as primary residences.

In most cases, the straw buyers claimed to be executives of companies that Romaniolis created and controlled. He was responsible for originating more than $5 million in residential mortgage loans in the scheme, authorities said. All of the properties ended up in foreclosure, resulting in a total loss of more than $2 million.

Romaniolis is to be sentenced March 27.

The case resulted from an investigation by the FBI and the California Attorney General’s Mortgage Fraud Task Force.


 

 

Adjustable Rate Mortgages May be More Appealing to Less Financially Secured Borrowers…

Less Financially Secure Borrowers More Likely to Choose Adjustable Mortgages

Three staff member of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco have published, on the Bank's website, results of a study about what drives the mortgage choices of borrowers.  The three, Fred Furlong, David Lang, and Yelena Takhtamanova looked at the question of whether lower-rated borrowers paid less attention to loan pricing and interest-rate-related factors because house prices were rising rapidly. 

They developed a model to account for the factors that influence mortgage choice.  Earlier research has found that mortgage pricing and other interest-rate-related fundamentals are key but they also looked at housing market conditions and borrower characteristics, such as degree of financial constraint, attitudes towards risk, and mobility. Research has shown that financially constrained borrowers, or those with lower credit ratingstend to favor adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) as do homebuyers who expect to only stay in a house a short time because ARMs have lower introductory interest rates.

Fixed-rate mortgages (FRM) initially tend to have higher interest rates than ARMs because they are tied to long-term interest rates which include a term premium to compensate investors for tying up their money longer. Both FRM and ARM rates include lender margins, that is, mark-ups reflecting general credit supply conditions, regional economic and housing market conditions, and individual borrower characteristics. Relative shifts in FRM and ARM margins can affect financing choices.

How much risk borrowers are willing to accept also can influence mortgage choice. Borrower risk tolerance can affect sensitivity to loan pricing, income volatility, and affordability in choosing mortgages. Borrowers with low credit ratings may be less sensitive to risk, for instance, because of lower cost of default. Research shows that more risk-averse borrowers tend to favor FRMs or option ARMs because they prefer to avoid the risk of future sharp rate increases possible with volatile adjustable-rate financing.

Thus, a mortgage choice model should include measures of the term premium, expected short-term interest rates over time, FRM and ARM margins, and interest rate volatility. In general, borrower preference for basic ARMs should increase as the term premium, expected short-term interest rates, and FRM margins rise, and ARM margins and interest rate volatility fall.  In other words, the more affordable ARMs become by comparison, the more they're favored.  No surprises here

Research also shows that the faster house prices are rising, the greater the probability that homebuyers will choose ARMs. In addition, rising house prices can affect the importance of interest-rate-related fundamentals when borrowers choose financing.

The researchers say that one view is that the housing boom was a bubble in which financing decisions for some borrowers were divorced from traditional fundamentals while another is that borrowers paid less attention to fundamentals during the housing boom, but that such a shift is consistent with rational decision-making models, given expectations of further house price appreciation. According to this view, with little or no change in house prices, homeowner decisions about moving or terminating a mortgage would generally reflect life-cycle events, such as illness, retirement, and job changes.

Rapid house price gains might change that.  During the boom homeowners expected to gain home equity as prices rose, allowing them to refinance even if they didn't plan to move or expected to flip houses soon after buying them.  Such short-term mortgages might make ARMs more attractive and reduce borrower sensitivity to interest-rate-related fundamentals.  In other words, they didn't care as much about the riskier nature of the loans because they planned on being out of them relatively quickly.

Finally, studies suggest that borrower financial literacy may affect mortgage choice.  Borrowers who choose ARMs appear more likely to underestimate or not understand how changes in interest rates would affect their loans. Hence, systematic differences in levels of financial literacy among borrowers at different risk levels could affect sensitivity to fundamentals. 

The study's model of mortgage choice allows for an examination of how these factors affected the decisions of borrowers at different credit risk levels. The authors studied a sample of about 9 million first-lien mortgages originated between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2007 allowing for three mortgage choices: FRMs, basic ARMs, and option ARMs.  Key model determinants are FRM and ARM margins, the 10-year Treasury term premium, expectations for short-term interest rates over time, and interest rate volatility. Controls included loan-to-value ratios, borrower credit risk, the two-year average change in house prices, and a measure of house price volatility. Finally, credit risk groups were defined by FICO scores: low, 660 or below, high, 760 or above, and medium 661 to 759.

The model allows the impact of interest-rate-related fundamentals to change as house prices rise. The estimates show that rising house prices have a sizable influence on the effect these fundamentals have on mortgage choice. The size of this effect differs according to borrower credit ratings.

 

Fig. 1

 

Figure 1 shows the impact of margins and term premiums on the probability of borrowers choosing an ARM.  The green bars indicate those factor's marginal effects if house prices are static.  A higher margin makes ARMs less attractive so the marginal effects are negative.  The low FICO group shows a greater effect indicating they are more sensitive to ARM mortgage pricing than the higher FICO cohort.  "Specifically, if house prices were flat, a 0.8 percentage point increase in the ARM margin would reduce the probability of low FICO borrowers choosing an ARM 13 percentage points and high FICO borrowers 8 percentage points. It is useful to compare this with the ARM share of mortgage originations, shown in Figure 2, which peaked at 50%."

The two year average house price appreciation was 16 percent.  The red bars show the offsetting effects of this with a reduction of one-third in the ARM margin to 8 percentage points for low FICO borrowers and 5 points for high FICO borrowers.  Similarly, house price appreciation reduces the impact of increases in the FRM margin and term premium on mortgage choice. Thus, even accounting for the influence of house price gains, lower FICO borrowers generally were at least as sensitive, if not more sensitive, to fundamentals as the high FICO borrowers.

 

Fig. 2

 

But, if low and high FICO borrowers gave similar consideration to interest- rate-related fundamentals, why were low FICO borrowers more likely to select ARMs during the housing boom?  Credit risk measures, including FICO scores and lender designation of borrowers as subprime, explain most of the difference in ARM shares. The authors considered whether borrowers would have made the same mortgage choice if, all else equal, they had different credit ratings. In Figure 3, for each month in the sample, they replaced the actual FICO score and subprime designation of each borrower in the low FICO group with the average score and subprime share of the high FICO group. The results of this hypothetical exercise, shown by the green line, suggest that the low FICO group's ARM share would have been closer to that of the high FICO group had their credit risk been similar.

 

Fig. 3

 

One could interpret the results as credit risk measures being associated with borrower level of financial sophistication or the findings could reflect economic decisions related to risk aversion, credit constraints, or differences in how quickly borrowers expect to refinance.  The authors conclude rising prices during the housing boom muted the influence of interest rate fundamentals on borrower mortgage choice, especially among borrowers with lower credit ratings.  But when house prices rose rapidly, those borrowers responded at least as strongly as higher-rated borrowers to changes in fundamentals. "This suggests," they say, "that the greater propensity of low FICO borrowers to choose ARMs is more consistent with mortgage choice reflecting economic considerations rather than lack of financial sophistication among low FICO borrowers."

 

APR’s not useful to shoppers…..

The Mortgage Professor: New disclosures fail to make APR useful to shoppers

 

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has developed two new disclosure forms designed to make the mortgage process more manageable for borrowers. The first two articles in this series showed that the new disclosures will not protect borrowers from unjustified price changes while the loan is in process, nor will it help borrowers shop for the best price. This article considers whether the disclosures will help borrowers select the type of mortgage that best meets their needs.

The new loan estimate form retains the annual percentage rate disclosure from the current Truth in Lending form, which makes sense. The APR is a good measure of the cost of the loan to the borrower over the period the borrower has it. The problem with the APR has always been that it is calculated over the full term of the mortgage, though very few borrowers have their mortgage for the full term. Here is an example of how the full-term APR can mislead borrowers with shorter time horizons.

On Dec. 27, a borrower with strong credit credentials shopping my site for a $200,000 loan was quoted 4.375 percent on a zero-fee, 30-year, fixed-rate loan, and also 3.375 percent with upfront fees of $19,000. Which is better? The APR on the first loan is 4.375 percent and on the second is 4.19 percent, suggesting that the low-rate/high-fee loan is better.

But if the APRs are calculated over five years rather than 30, the APRs are 4.375 percent and 5.67 percent. Compressing the fees into a shorter period raises the APR on the high fee loan. The borrower in this case has to expect to be in the house for more than 14 years to make the low-rate/high-fee loan the better choice.

There are two possible remedies for this problem. The best is to ask borrowers to provide a best guess as to how long they will have the mortgage, and calculate the APR over that period. An alternative is to calculate the APR over several periods. While borrowers would have to do their own interpolations, this would be far better than encouraging them to believe that the APR calculated over the full term applied to them.

The CFPB has done neither. Only one APR is shown on the loan estimate, and it is the same full-term APR that is on the Truth in Lending disclosure.

The APR on adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs, has another problem. An APR calculation requires an interest rate for every month the loan is in force. On ARMs, the rate is known only for the initial rate period. The rate that kicks in after that is based on the value of the interest rate index at that time, which is not known at the outset.

The assumption used in the APR calculation for ARMs is that the interest rate index remains unchanged through the life of the loan – a "no-change scenario." A 5/1 ARM that was available Dec. 27 at 3.25 percent with zero fees had an APR of 2.98 percent, the result of assuming that the index rate of 0.584 percent at that time remained unchanged for 30 years.

Of course, no assumption about interest rates in the next 30 years is going to be right. To be useful to borrowers, the APR on ARMs should be disclosed using alternative scenarios that are likely to bracket the possible outcomes. A no-change scenario could be usefully combined with a worst-case scenario, where it is assumed that the rate on the ARM increases by the maximum amounts allowed by contractual rate adjustment caps and maximum rates.

Consider a borrower trying to decide between the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at 4.375 percent and zero fees, and a 5/1 ARM available at the same time at 3.25 percent and zero fees. The APR on the fixed-rate mortgage is 4.375 percent regardless of future rates. The adjustable-rate mortgage has an APR of 2.98 percent on a no-change scenario, and 6.13 percent on a worst case scenario, which is not very helpful. But that is because the ARM APRs are calculated over 30 years. Here are some other worst-case APRs on the ARM:

-Five years: 3.25 percent

-Eight years: 4.39 percent

-12 years: 5.38 percent

-30 years: 6.13 percent

Note that at eight years, the worst-case APR is very close to the APR on the fixed-rate mortgage. This means that a borrower who expects to be out of the house within eight years will do better with the ARM. That is useful information.

The upshot is that the APR would be useful to borrowers in making mortgage selections if it were calculated for multiple periods, and if on ARMs it was calculated on both no-change and worst-case scenarios.

Instead, CFPB has decided to leave the APR as it is, and to add three additional measures: total interest paid over the loan term, total payments of all types over five years, and total principal payments over five years. These measures seem to have been selected because borrowers understand them, but that does not make them helpful in choosing between different mortgage types. For that purpose, they are largely useless.

 

 

Non QM Lending…

Wells and Others Gear up For Non-QM LendingJan 8 2014, 11:02AM

With new rules defining Qualified Mortgages (QM) slated to kick in on Friday at least two lenders have indicated they will make room for loans that don't quite fit the government mandated mold.  The two, Wells Fargo and Bank of the West, plan to write at least some of the loans, retaining them for their own portfolios. 

Bank of the West, headquartered in Omaha says it will continue to offer interest only loans to its customers even though the loans fall outside the guidelines established by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  Paul Wible, Senior Executive Vice President and Head of the bank's National Finance Group said in a statement this week, "We extensively reviewed the CFPB's rules and found them broadly consistent with how Bank of the West has always done business. At the same time, we know that interest-only loans can fulfill the mortgage needs of many of our customers. Therefore, even though they do not fit the CFPB's definition of a QM, we will continue to offer them as before."

Wible said that the bank's analysis confirmed its belief that a well-underwritten, interest only loan could be good for its customers and safe for the bank to hold on its balance sheet.  These loans, he said, meet the needs of certain customers such as the self-employed and that the bank will continue to require that such borrowers meet its prudent underwriting criteria.

Bank of the West, a subsidiary of BNP Paribas, has assets of $65 billion and operates 600 retail and commercial banking locations in 19 states.

On a much larger scale, Wells Fargo, the country's largest home lender is reported to be readying a group to handle nothing but portfolio loans.  Bloomberg says the bank has created "a swat team" of about 400 underwriters who will originate mortgages for the bank to hold.  As many as 40 percent of the loans are expected to be outside of new government guidelines. 

Bloomberg said they were told by Brad Blackwell, head of portfolio lending at the bank that the group will review loans that do not qualify for the safe harbor protections of new CFPB rules as a way to increase lending without losing control of quality.   

'"We have separated the underwriting group into a separate team that only underwrites loans" for the bank's own balance sheet,' Blackwell told Bloomberg.  '"We found it impossible to achieve our objectives" with the two groups together, he said.'

The bank's portfolio held $72.4 billion in non-conforming mortgages at the end of the third quarter, 14.5 billion of which Wells Fargo added in the second and third quarters of 2013.

 

Best Day of the Year for Mortgage Rates…

Best Day of the Year for Mortgage Rates

Mortgage rates fell at their fastest pace in 2014 and to their best levels.  Such a feat was only manageable due to what has been an exceptionally flat market up to this point.  Even today's move was fairly small by historically standards, equating to only 0.03 percent in terms of rate.  That means that the improvements over yesterday would be seen in the form of lower closing costs with interest still averaging 4.625%for ideal, conforming 30yr Fixed loans (best-execution).

To put the recent flatness in more perspective, there have only been 3 days in the past 30 where rates moved any more than they did today.  It continues to be the case that the events in the latter half of the week (beginning tomorrow morning) have more potential to break the monotony, or rather, to continue breaking the monotony that was preemptively broken today. 

Whereas the movement seen so far in 2014 has largely been a product of market participation ramping back up, the upcoming movement may be more motivated by the tenor of the economic data.  As such, strong data can push rates back toward recent highs while weak data could help this correction/bounce continue.


Loan Originator Perspectives

"Rates continued to improve today adding to the gains from yesterday. As of the time I write this, most lenders have yet to pass along any of the improvements. As stated yesterday, as the week continues, the data becomes much more market moving which makes floating very risky. At this point, there isn't much to be gained unless the data is down right horrible which is unlikely. I would advise and am advising clients to lock in later today especially if they are within 30 days of closing." –Victor Burek, Open Mortgage

"As we conjectured yesterday, we got some additional pricing gains today. The bulk of this week's MBS "meal" starts tomorrow with a salad of ADP December Employment and December Fed minutes. The entrée arrives Friday AM when Decembers' NFP jobs report is released. Nice to see improvement, but it's nothing definitive at the moment. If you floated the last 2 days, you've gained some house money. Whether you want to roll the dice again depends on personal risk tolerance!" –Ted Rood, Senior Originator, Wintrust Mortgage

"Based on the latest rate movements, we may see some more improvements. Maybe the race to 3% on the 10 year was premature, but then again good numbers this week for jobs and we blow by 3%. Cautiously float but realize big risks. " –Michael Owens, VP of Mortgage Lending at Guaranteed Rate, Inc. NMLS # 107434

 


Today's Best-Execution Rates

  • 30YR FIXED – 4.625%
  • FHA/VA – 4.25%
  • 15 YEAR FIXED –  3.5%
  • 5 YEAR ARMS –  3.0-3.50% depending on the lender


Ongoing Lock/Float Considerations

  • The prospect of the Fed reducing its asset purchases weighed heavy on interest rates for the 2nd half of 2013, causing volatility and generally pervasive upward movement.
  • Tapering ultimately happened on December 18th, 2013.  Markets had done so much to come to terms with it ahead of time that it essentially just confirmed the the 6 month move higher in rates, but didn't make for another immediate spike higher.
  • That said, we should assume that we're still in a rising rate environment on average.
  • NOTE: Lenders had begun adjusting rate sheets to account for the most recent announced hike inGuarantee Fees.  This would have unequivocally raised rates by at least an eighth of a percent for almost every borrower, and in most cases .25-.375%.  Those changes are now on hold indefinitely.  We won't know if they're coming back or not until we hear more official word from new FHFA Director Mel Watt.
  • (As always, please keep in mind that our Best-Execution rate always pertains to a completely ideal scenario.  There are many reasons a quoted rate may differ from our average rates, and in those cases, assuming you're following along on a day to day basis, simply use the Best-Ex levels we quote as a baseline to track potential movement in your quoted rate).

Best Regards, Chris mesunas